Dear ATCA Colleagues; dear IntentBloggers

[Please note that the views presented by individual contributors are not necessarily representative of the views of ATCA, which is neutral. ATCA conducts collective Socratic dialogue on global opportunities and threats.]

We are grateful to Vice Admiral Dr Verghese Koithara from Wellington in Tamil Nadu, India, for his submission to ATCA, "The India-Pakistan Peace Process gathers momentum in the midst of India's near double digit Growth and Global Ascendancy."

Vice Admiral Dr Verghese Koithara, formerly with the Indian Navy, is often described as India's finest strategic thinkers. He is the author of two important books: Crafting Peace in Kashmir - Through a Realist Lens [2004, Sage] and Society, State and Security - The Indian Experience [1999, Sage].

"Crafting Peace in Kashmir" presents a completely new perspective on the Kashmir conflict, this book argues that resolving the situation can be brought about through a 'peace strategy' rather than a 'war strategy'. Through an analysis of the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and Palestine, Vice-Admiral Koithara draws parallels between the India-Pakistan conflict. He also presents reasons why a durable peace - based on the Line of Control becoming the settled border and the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir being given parallel and substantial autonomy - can be achieved in today's conditions. The book concludes that peace between India and Pakistan is possible based on political realism and that strategic solutions that safeguard the interests of both countries are available.

"Society, State and Security" asks: Can the Indian state reconcile the demands of human and national security? In a well-documented and wide-ranging analysis, Vice-Admiral Koithara contends that there is more to security than territorial integrity and the preservation of state sovereignty. He traces the development of the Indian state since independence, examines the impact of the external environment on the country, and contrasts the experience of India, China and Indonesia in their handling of security concerns. He examines the contemporary situation, impacts of the global system, and assesses the military and non-military dangers India is likely to face in the future. He delineates areas that are important for the security of both India and its people and recommends that in managing national security both the politico-military and socio-economic dimensions must be considered. He writes:

Dear DK and Colleagues

Re: The India-Pakistan Peace Process gathers momentum in the midst of India's near double digit Growth and Global Ascendancy

I would like to share with ATCA the very considerable progress the India-Pakistan peace effort has made recently. Never before have the two countries engaged each other so intensely or purposively. Both have moved away from long-hardened policy positions, and this has surprised most people in the two countries, and abroad. There is not much comprehension yet of the historic nature of these shifts, or of the strategic reasons that have brought them about.

In the context of President Musharraf's remarks on December 4, 2006 that Pakistan was willing to give up its claim on the Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) subject to demilitarisation, self-governance, soft Line of Control and a supervisory mechanism, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a very significant comment on December 16, "in the last two-and-a half years we have had very intensive dialogue with Pakistan." The statements coming out from the two sides are no longer unilateral ones, but part of a gradually strengthening joint understanding. Both sides, Pakistan much more than India, have jettisoned several hardened positions.

The Shifts

The biggest shift has been Pakistan's decision to seek political and security comfort through a new approach. It has abandoned the radioactive issue of territorial change for the tractable one of a softened, peaceful Line of Control (LoC) between the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's carefully chosen words of May 20, 2004, "short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything. Meanwhile we need soft borders -- the borders are not so important," had created the opening for this. India's decision to talk to Pakistan substantively on J&K was another big shift. During the four decades of 1964-2003 India and Pakistan had not discussed J&K seriously. Official level and back channel talks and occasional low-key summit meetings since mid-2004 have changed this.

Another signal change has been Pakistan Army's realisation that in the changed circumstances peace with India will serve, rather than hinder, not only Pakistan's national interests but also the army's corporate interests. India, on its part, has now recognised that waiting for a civilian leader who can deal with India and ignoring the army is not a pragmatic course. The Pakistan Army has also realised that the "fight and talk" strategy that the country pursued during the 1990s was unworkable. The failure of seven rounds of Foreign Secretary level talks during 1990-94 and of the resumed talks during 1997-1999 proved this. To talk productively, the fighting had to cease. This was what led to Pakistan's unilateral ceasefire of November 23, 2003, which has been respected now by both sides for over three years.

Pakistan has also begun to move away from purblind "anti-Indianism" as an anchor of state policy. This anchor came unstuck when India became a globally-courted country. The muted de-emphasising of religion seen recently in Pakistan is linked to this, which in turn is reflected in Pakistan's shift of position on the regional geography of J&K. As late as October 25, 2004, Musharraf was talking of five regions on the Indian side in the context of differentiated treatment. The object was to separate the Muslim majority areas in Jammu and Ladakh. But seven months later, on May 20, 2005 he stated that the identification of regions need not be on a religious basis. Stripping the Kashmir problem of its religious dimension has made matters easier.

Both India and Pakistan have changed their attitudes towards J&K's dissidents. India started to talk to them for the first time in January 2000. Three years later Pakistan began to encourage them to talk to India, a reversal of earlier policy. Pakistan realised that the dissidents could better serve as a bridge between the two countries, rather than as ineffectual Pakistani allies. The dissidents, on their part, have realised that they have to now prepare for elections. Not just J&K's mainstream parties, but the dissidents too are converging on the empowered governance path, widely seen now as having the maximum electoral appeal.

The Reasons

There are good reasons to think that these important shifts, unanticipated by most, rest not on tactical foundations but on strategic ones. In both countries there is a new preoccupation with economic growth. This has changed the public mood. India is determined to push for double digit growth and Pakistan for something close to it. Both do not want to be distracted. Both countries also know that J&K is not the only conflict they are involved in. The Pashtun belt and Baluchistan are major worries for Pakistan. India has problems in its north-eastern states and with Maoists who are active in 160 of its 602 districts. There is an accentuated realisation in both countries of the high indirect and opportunity costs of their many conflicts, and the need for new, creative approaches to deal with them.

Equally important, the euphoria-stage of nuclear weapons acquisition has passed in both countries. There is a growing concern about responsible nuclear weapons management. In current South Asia, where no effective nuclear-specific CBMs are possible (because of the way the arsenals are structured), the focus has to be on conflict abatement. In the context of his soft LoC approach, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had said on May 20, 2004, "Two (inimical) nuclear armed powers living in such close proximity is a big problem. We have an obligation to solve this problem." Both the 1999 Kargil War and the 2001-02 Operation Parakram have imparted major lessons to both countries.

Most importantly, there is a dawning recognition that the true stakes in the India-Pakistan conflict, as they have evolved over sixty years, are low. A look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can help understand how much more potentially tractable the India-Pakistan conflict is. There is nothing in J&K to whip up passions the way Jerusalem does -- particularly the co-location of Temple Mount and Haram al-Sharif. Nor is in J&K any resource stake comparable to the Jordan River system and aquifers in that parched land. Also, given the geography, it is difficult to create a Palestinian state that will neither be choked by Israel nor will threaten Israel. India and Pakistan are both secure in the territories they currently hold. Moreover, all India-Pakistan issues other than J&K -- Siachen which is a part of J&K, Sir Creek and Indus Water Treaty disputes -- are eminently solvable.

The reduction in violence in J&K has also contributed to India's ability to be creative. The year 2006 has seen the lowest level of violence for a decade, and the downward trend has been steady. Pakistan has realised that it cannot use killings to create negotiating leverage, although major Pakistan-linked terrorist outrages have occurred in India in 2005-06 -- including the infamous one in Mumbai and lesser ones in Delhi and Varanasi. Assessing the respective roles played by the Pakistani government, its Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) organisation and terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba have so far involved data-scarce subjective judgements. But what is clear is that Pakistan is very aware of the raised costs of sponsored-terrorism against India, and India in turn seems to think, for the present, that it is better to treat the Pakistan government, ISI and terrorist groups as separate but linked entities, rather than as a composite one controlled from the top. This is the logic of the joint anti-terrorist mechanism the two countries gingerly created in September 2006.

A Set of Principles

During the two-and-a half years of intense dialogue that has gone on, a set of principles on which a peace edifice could be built has emerged. There has been no joint enunciation of these, but there have been repeated comments by the Pakistani President and occasional supportive ones by the Indian Prime Minister, which make clear what these principles are. This has reduced uncertainty about the path the two parties are embarked on and has defined the envelope within which the two sides can be creative. It is of course a fact that each of these principles holds a spectrum of choices, and both India and Pakistan, as of now, have very different preferences within each spectrum. But this does not detract from the great achievement the evolution of these principles signifies.

The first principle is that there shall be no alteration to the current LoC which will become a permanent, not-to-be-questioned-later sovereignty divide. In parallel, the line will also become "open," permitting much freer movement of people and goods of the two parts of the state. How free these movements can be will have to be pragmatically determined because of the twin needs to keep undesirable people out and to ensure that mutual access is confined to the other part of the state and not to the rest of the parent country.

The second principle is that there shall be "equal-level empowered governance" in the two parts. Devising ways to ensure that security and other critical interests of the two centres are taken care of and also that this shall not vitiate empowered governance will undoubtedly be the toughest problem to tackle. But not far behind it will be the one of ensuring that minority regions within the two groups -- Jammu, Ladakh and Northern Areas -- will have adequate freedom of regional-level governance. This, in turn, is complicated by the fact that there is considerable heterogeneity of interests within each of these regions.

The third principle is that there shall be a substantial thinning of military personnel in both parts of the state. If Pakistan can effectively ensure that there shall be no movement of violence-creators to the Indian part of J&K, and if both sides can ensure that they will not retain serious conventional offensive capabilities across the LoC, this is not a difficult "end state" to achieve. But the process of getting there will not be easy given the security vulnerabilities and anxieties the process will generate.

The final principle is that there should be some form of permanent India-Pakistan arrangement to oversee the new set up. The Indian Prime Minister has used the realistic term "institutional arrangements" and the Pakistani President the fanciful one of "joint management" to describe this. The main purpose of this fourth principle, which will not involve any element of power-sharing, is to constrain the rollback of the other three principles by either side.

What Has Been Achieved

Besides the development of these four important principles, what else has been achieved during the past two-and-a-half years? The infusion of respectability to the idea of India-Pakistan conflict resolution has been a great accomplishment. The idea that the two sides are structurally conflicted and that no amount of creativity or finessing can overcome the impasse, unless one side capitulated out of exhaustion, has been long-ingrained in the minds of most people. This served to inhibit a creative peace search as well as support for such a search. The rethinking now going on about this received wisdom is a very welcome development.

A related achievement has been a perceptual shift whereby the future is now becoming more important than the past. When there was no prospect of conflict resolution, the future had been disregarded and the focus in both countries had been on the past. Assiduous, selective trawling of history, law and anthropology by scholars had served mostly to justify the respective stances and arguments of the two sides and had done little to create a peace path into the future. This is now changing. There is a new desire to shed the debilitating baggage of lawyerly arguments.

Another major achievement has been the creation of a hitherto non-existent focus on the welfare of the people of J&K. While India and Pakistan have essentially been contestants, the people of the state have largely been hapless victims. As it has turned out, the four principles that have got developed all serve to benefit the people of the divided state and address their grievances.

At the practical level, the great achievement has been the creation of markedly smoother India-Pakistan negotiating channels. Many assess that these channels have never functioned more purposively nor the formal and back channels complemented one another better. There have been a slow, but discernible graduation from the "talks" stage to the "negotiations" stage, from active distrust to limited trust.

The Rocky Road Ahead

While much has been achieved, the challenges ahead are more formidable than those overcome so far. Establishing mutually acceptable principles has been tough, but to reach a wide array of specific agreements involving hard bargaining will be tougher. Translating abstract concepts to doable steps is never easy, especially when many more political and institutional players, not only from India and Pakistan but also from the two parts of the state, enter the arena.

A still bigger problem is the political risk the two governments may face. Opinion on both sides is fragmented and it is not clear how much support hardliners can muster. The vulnerabilities are not at the electoral level, for the bulk of the people in both countries are for peace. But a call to "go for uncompromised victory" will appeal to many urban segments. Accusations of effete thinking and being the other side's dupes are going to fly. And television could magnify the extent and impact of urban protests. There will be major opposition at institutional levels too. Collective mindsets of institutions are never easy to change. And these mindsets, hardened by sixty years of conflict, are bitterly antagonistic towards the other side.

The bright side is that the public mood in both countries is largely in support of peace. There is very little of the hawkishness currently seen in Sri Lanka. At the elite level, outside those segments focused on security, there is a marked desire to stress economic growth and discourage conflict pursuit. At the international level, while a highly distracted US is playing a less involved role, probably for the good at this stage, there is little doubt that the international community is strongly supportive of the ongoing peace effort -- primarily because of the nuclear angle. All these might well help to overcome political and institutional opposition in both countries.

Best regards


Verghese Koithara

[ENDS]

We look forward to your further thoughts, observations and views. Thank you.

Best wishes



For and on behalf of DK Matai
Chairman, Asymmetric Threats Contingency Alliance (ATCA)
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ATCA: The Asymmetric Threats Contingency Alliance is a philanthropic expert initiative founded in 2001 to resolve complex global challenges through collective Socratic dialogue and joint executive action to build a wisdom based global economy. Adhering to the doctrine of non-violence, ATCA addresses opportunities and threats arising from climate chaos; radical poverty; geo-politics, organised crime & extremism; advanced technologies -- bio, info, nano, robo & AI; demographic skews; pandemics; and financial systems. Present membership of ATCA is by invitation only and has over 5,000 distinguished members from over 100 countries: including several from the House of Lords, House of Commons, EU Parliament, US Congress & Senate, G10's Senior Government officials and over 1,500 CEOs from financial institutions, scientific corporates and voluntary organisations as well as over 750 Professors from academic centres of excellence worldwide.

The views presented by individual contributors are not necessarily representative of the views of ATCA, which is neutral. Please do not forward or use the material circulated without permission and full attribution.
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